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Both excessive and insufficient levels of expenditure decentralization reduce efficiency of 
government and service provision, thereby exerting an adverse impact on national sustainable 
development. The main goal of this paper is to explore this proposition theoretically and 
empirically, seeking to determine the optimal level of expenditure decentralization. From a 
theoretical perspective, we introduce the expenditures of central and sub-national governments 
into Barro’s (1990) model and find a hump-shaped relationship between expenditure 
decentralization and sustainable development as well as striking upon the optimal expenditure 
decentralization on the theoretical level. To further test this finding empirically, we adopt the 
NSDI (National Sustainable Development Index) to measure sustainable development and use 
panel data for 52 countries covering the period 1991-2016 to validate the theorized hump-
shaped relationship between expenditure decentralization and sustainable development both in 
the short and long run. These results remain significant even in two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
estimations with the Geographic Fragmentation Index (GFI) as the instrumental variable and 
are robust to alternative specifications. Finally, we also utilize the Lind-Mehlum method to 
determine the optimal level of expenditure decentralization and find results consistent with the 
other methods. 
 
Keywords: sustainable development; fiscal decentralization; NSDI; Lind-Mehlum method; 







* This paper is supported by the Major program project of the National Social Science Fund of 
China (No: 19ZDA055). Please address all correspondence to Jin Hui, School of Economics and 
Management, Zhejiang Sci-Tech University, Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province, 310018 China (E-mail: 
jinhui2017@zjut.edu.cn; Phone +86 18767121770). 
 
1 School of Economics and Management, Zhejiang Sci-Tech University 
2 Ecological Civilization Research Center of Zhejiang Province 







This paper focuses on the impact of fiscal expenditure decentralization on sustainable 
development. In recent decades, the excessive consumption of natural resources, the 
deterioration of the environment and the imbalance of social economic development, have 
become increasingly serious problems, leading to many countries and international organizations 
to put forward plans or goals for sustainable development, such as the United Nations 2030 
Agenda. And while the literature on fiscal decentralization has paid considerable attention to the 
impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth (Martinez-Vazquez et al., 2017), it has 
ignored the broader and increasingly urgent issue of its impact on sustainable development.  
Decentralized subnational governments may play important roles in the economic, social 
and environmental dimensions of national sustainable development. Fiscal decentralization helps 
give full play to local governments’ information advantages and initiative, leading to overall 
increased economic efficiency. However, excessive fiscal decentralization can also lead to lost 
economic efficiency and other negative effects such as intensified predatory intergovernmental 
competition, distorting the composition of public expenditures with an adverse impact on 
sustainable development. This means that there is likely to be an appropriate level of fiscal 
decentralization that is the optimal choice for national sustainable development. 
 However, to the best of our knowledge, until now no one has studied the impact of fiscal 
decentralization on sustainable development. As reviewed in the next section, a growing list of 
economic studies have analyzed the factors impacting sustainable development and some of 
them have pointed out the important effect of fiscal policy, but fiscal decentralization has been 
ignored as a potential important factor. 





fiscal expenditure decentralization on sustainable development and in doing so analyzes what the 
optimal level of expenditure decentralization may be. To achieve this goal, we use a panel data 
set of 52 countries, including 20 developed countries and 32 developing countries, over two 
periods, 2010-2016 for short-run effect estimates and 1991-2015 for long-run effect estimates, 
and apply the Geographic Fragmentation Index (GFI) as an instrumental variable to solve the 
endogeneity problem with the two-stage least squared (2SLS) approach. We find a strong, 
statistically significant non-linear (hump-shaped) relationship between expenditure 
decentralization and sustainable development, implying an average optimal level of expenditure 
decentralization ranging between 0.31 and 0.40, although the specific optimal expenditure 
decentralization level for national sustainable development depends, of course, on the actual 
conditions and development level of a country. The empirical results are robust to alternative 
measurements of sustainable development and fiscal decentralization. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is literature review. Section 3 
develops a theoretical framework. Section 4 describes the National Sustainable Development 
Index, methodology, and data. Section 5 presents the empirical results, robustness check, and 
estimation of optimal expenditure decentralization. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Review of the Literature  
The concept of sustainable development originated from ecology, and more recently, it 
has also become a main theme in economics, and environmental science and sociology (Ramos 
& Caeiro, 2009; Bolcárová & KološTa, 2015). Environmentalists and ecologists study 
sustainable development from the perspectives of environment pollution, biodiversity, and 
ecosystem optimization, focusing on the long-term and healthy survival of human beings as well 
as the sustainability of the ecosystem and regional environments (Adrián & Américo, 2002; 





and methods can contribute to promote sustainable development (Ranis et al., 2000; Bilbao-
Ubillos, 2013; Bolcárová & Kološta, 2015). Sociologists emphasize how structural systems, 
including markets, policy, moral standards, science, and technology can maximize the 
cohesiveness of nature and society into sustainable development (Ma et al., 2015). Although the 
research perspectives on sustainable development are different in these various fields, their 
essence and goals are the same: sustainable development requires the coordination of economic, 
social, and environmental development with the goal to balance intra-generational welfare and 
maximize the total welfare of all generations (Jin et al., 2020). 
A growing body of economic studies have analyzed the potential role of a list of factors 
as determinants of sustainable development. First, a number of studies have established that non-
renewable energy consumption and excessive dependence on natural resources are not conducive 
to sustainable development (Atkinson & Hamilton, 2003; Koirala & Pradhan, 2019). A related 
literature explores the impact of the electric power industry on sustainable development (Swain 
& Karimu, 2020). Others have researched how information and communication technology, by 
reducing information communication costs, helps decrease energy consumption and leads to 
more sustainable development (Danish et al., 2019). Additionally, positive institutional 
environments, democracy, greater social fairness, higher education, and human capital growth 
have been found to be important drivers of sustainable development (Gnegne, 2009; Finnveden 
et al., 2019). From a developing country perspective, several other studies have found foreign 
direct investment, corruption, quality of governance, the legal system, and violent conflict to be 
significant determinants of sustainable development (Reiter & Steensma, 2010).  
More closely related to our goal in this paper, a number of papers have explored the 





(2016) and Güney (2017) highlight the role of good governance on social, economic, and 
environmental development, and ultimately on sustainable development. Barbier and Burgess 
(2020) look at the role of subsidized clean energy and increased taxation on the use of fossil 
energy to promote sustainable development in developing countries. None of these works, 
however, look at the decentralization aspect of fiscal management. 
Based purely on existing theory, fiscal decentralization may be an important factor 
affecting the national sustainable development. Since Tiebout’s (1956) seminal paper, a large 
number of researchers have considered the impact of fiscal decentralization on economic 
development, such as Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Qian and Roland (1998), Thiessen (2003), 
Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007), Bodman (2011), Gemmell et al. (2013), and Canavire-
Bacarreza et al. (2020). Another strand of the literature on fiscal decentralization has emphasized 
how intergovernmental competition may distort fiscal choices toward “productive expenditures” 
with direct economic benefits, such as infrastructure, rather than other areas lacking direct 
economic benefits, such as environmental protection, public health, or education, further 
affecting national development in various dimensions (Keen & Marchand, 1997; Qian & Roland, 
1998; Kappeler et al., 2013; Sacchi & Salotti, 2014; Arze et al., 2016; Jin & Qian, 2020). 
Combining the insights of these branches of literature, it may be theorized that 
decentralization could have an inverted U-shaped impact on national sustainable development, 
and that selecting an appropriate degree of decentralization is important to successful 
sustainability efforts. The essence of the concept of sustainable development is that we should 
pursue social and economic development to ensure the welfare of present generations, while 
protecting the ecological environment and rationally utilizing natural resources to ensure the 





economic growth, that would also not a sustainable development mode, as it would lead to 
increased pressure to exploit resources for short-term survival. Neither can near-term economic 
development be the only goal, as the rapid exhaustion of finite resources would leaving nothing 
on which future generations could survive. Much like the balancing act of sustainable 
development itself, so an appropriate degree of fiscal decentralization trades off the welfare of 
present and future generations and facilitates achievement of national sustainable development. 
3. Theoretical Framework 
As discussed above, sustainable development implies the coordination of economic, 
social, and environmental development to balance intra-generational welfare and the 
maximization of the total welfare of generations. This concept can be expressed in economic 
terms as the maximization of the total utility of generations. This paper studies the relationship 
between sustainable development and fiscal expenditure decentralization by analyzing what the 
optimal level of expenditure decentralization is to maximize intergenerational utility. In doing so, 
we express the representative agent’s utility function by Eq. (1) (following Barro [1990] and 
Zhang and Zou [2001]):  
𝑈𝑈 = ∫ 𝑢𝑢(𝑐𝑐,𝑔𝑔)∞0 𝑒𝑒
−𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑              (1) 
Where c is per capita private consumption, 𝑔𝑔 is fiscal expenditure, and 𝜌𝜌 is the (positive) 
time discount rate. The utility function 𝑢𝑢(𝑐𝑐,𝑔𝑔) is a concave function monotonically increasing in 
private consumption and fiscal expenditure. Fiscal expenditure captures the supply of all public 
goods and services.  
To allow for multiple tiers of governments and thereby expenditure decentralization, we 
further divide expenditure 𝑔𝑔 into central government expenditure n and sub-national government 





there will be I central governments, and so the central government expenditure vector n can be 
obtained, as shown in Eq (2), as can the sub-national government expenditure vector l (J>I) as 
given by Eq (3). 
𝑛𝑛 = (𝑛𝑛1, … ,𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 , … ,𝑛𝑛𝐼𝐼)                 (2) 
𝑙𝑙 = (𝑙𝑙1, … , 𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗 , … , 𝑙𝑙𝐽𝐽)               (3) 
The production function is built according to the Cobb-Douglas approach: 
𝑦𝑦 = 𝑘𝑘𝛼𝛼[∏ 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖=1 ]𝛽𝛽[∏ 𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗
𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗=1 ]
𝛾𝛾              (4) 
where 𝑦𝑦 is per capita capital output, k is per capita capital stock, 1 > 𝛼𝛼 > 0, 1 > 𝛽𝛽 > 0, 1 >
𝛾𝛾 > 0, and 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 + 𝛾𝛾 = 1. The expenditure budgets of central government and sub-national 
government are given by Eq (5) and Eq (6):  
∑ 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖=1 = 𝜃𝜃𝑛𝑛𝑔𝑔                (5) 
∑ 𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗
𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗=1 = 𝜃𝜃𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔                (6) 
Let 𝜃𝜃𝑛𝑛 + 𝜃𝜃𝑙𝑙 = 1, 0 < 𝜃𝜃𝑛𝑛 < 1, 0 < 𝜃𝜃𝑙𝑙 < 1, where 𝜃𝜃𝑛𝑛 indicates the share of central 
government expenditure in general government expenditure and 𝜃𝜃𝑙𝑙 indicates the share of sub-
national government expenditure in general government expenditure. We further assume that the 
central government spends a share of 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 (𝑖𝑖 = 1, … , 𝐼𝐼) on its 𝑖𝑖th item 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖, and that the sub-national 
government spends a share of 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗 (𝑗𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽𝐽) on its 𝑗𝑗th item 𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗, as shown in Eq (7) and Eq (8):  
𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 = 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝜃𝜃𝑛𝑛𝑔𝑔, ∑ 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖=1 = 1               (7) 
𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗 = 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗𝜃𝜃𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔, ∑ 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗
𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗=1 = 1               (8) 
Under the assumption of fiscal equilibrium, the share of revenue in GDP (𝜏𝜏) is equal to the share 
of expenditure (𝑔𝑔) in GDP, that is, 𝜏𝜏 = 𝑔𝑔/𝑦𝑦. At the same time, substituting 𝑛𝑛 and 𝑙𝑙 into the utility 
function Eq (1), we obtain the following: 
𝑈𝑈 = ∫ 𝑢𝑢(𝑐𝑐,𝑛𝑛, 𝑙𝑙)∞0 𝑒𝑒
−𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑              (9) 







= (1− 𝜏𝜏)𝑦𝑦 − 𝑐𝑐 = (1− 𝜏𝜏)[∏ 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖=1 ]𝛽𝛽[∏ 𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗
𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗=1 ]
𝛾𝛾 − 𝑐𝑐            (10) 
For convenience, let the utility function be: 
𝑢𝑢(𝑐𝑐,𝑛𝑛, 𝑙𝑙) = 𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛 𝑐𝑐 + 𝜎𝜎𝑛𝑛 𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛∏ 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖=1 + 𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙 𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛∏ 𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗
𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗=1            (11) 
where σ𝑛𝑛 and σ𝑙𝑙 are positive. When the output rate of fiscal expenditures (𝑛𝑛 and 𝑙𝑙) are measured 
by β and γ respectively, then their impact on the agent’s utility can be measured by σ𝑛𝑛 and σ𝑙𝑙.  
Assuming that 𝜏𝜏 is exogenous and fixed (as well as the 𝑔𝑔
𝑦𝑦





















𝑗𝑗=1               (12) 
Therefore, when the total intergenerational utility is maximized, and the sustainable development 
mode and the balanced growth path are achieved, the growth rate of per capita capital is: 
𝑑𝑑𝑦𝑦/𝑑𝑑𝜌𝜌
𝑦𝑦
= 𝛼𝛼(1− 𝜏𝜏) 𝑦𝑦
𝑑𝑑




















𝑗𝑗=1 − 𝜌𝜌         (14) 
since ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖=1 = 1 and ∑ 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗
𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗=1 = 1, Eq (14) can be simplified as Eq (15): 
𝑑𝑑𝑦𝑦/𝑑𝑑𝜌𝜌
𝑦𝑦












𝛼𝛼 − 𝜌𝜌            (15) 
According to Eq (14) and Eq (15), the maximization of total intergenerational utility is 
closely related to fiscal revenue and expenditure decentralization, which implies that expenditure 
decentralization is a determinant of sustainable development. Therefore, when the total 
intergenerational utility is maximized, the optimal expenditure ratios of the central and sub-













 are the optimal expenditure ratios of the central government and 
sub-national government, respectively. This means that we can take 𝛾𝛾
𝛽𝛽+𝛾𝛾





expenditure decentralization: when the share of sub-national expenditure exceeds 𝛾𝛾
𝛽𝛽+𝛾𝛾
, reducing 
the share of sub-national expenditure is conducive to increased sustainable development; when 
the share of sub-national expenditure is lower than 𝛾𝛾
𝛽𝛽+𝛾𝛾
, increasing it is conducive to increased 
sustainable development. So, we can state the following hypothesis: 
H: there is a hump-shaped relationship between expenditure decentralization and 
sustainable development. 
In fact, it is quite intuitive to understand this hump-shaped relationship; if the degree of 
expenditure decentralization is too high or too low, it will lead to a reduction of efficiency and 
therefore to the loss of utility (Janeba & Wilson, 2011). To illustrate this point, we can take two 
extreme cases: absolute fiscal expenditure decentralization or complete centralization, as 
follows: 
The absolute expenditure decentralization case, that is, where local governments bear all 
fiscal expenditures and responsibilities, will lead to three types of issues. First, it will 
reduce the scale economies effect of some public goods’ supply (Oates, 1972; Rodden, 
2003), such as national defense, legislation, diplomacy, etc. Second, it will intensify some 
issues about cross-regional public goods’ supply. For example, local governments will 
bicker about and free-ride on cross-regional pollution prevention without the coordination 
and control of the central government. More generally, it will reduce the supply 
efficiency of some public goods (Keen & Marchand, 1997; Zhang & Zou, 1998). Third, it 
will aggravate the imbalance and inequality of public goods’ supply among regions. For 
regions with developed economies and abundant resource endowments, public goods’ 
supply will be guaranteed in quality and quantity, likely accelerating the further 
development of these areas. Meanwhile, disadvantaged areas lacking those positive 
conditions will have less access to public goods and develop relatively more slowly. This 
will lead to a vicious cycle and to the continuous expansion of regional fiscal and 
economic imbalance and inequity (Qian et al., 1996; Ferrario & Zanardi, 2011). 
In the absolute centralization case, the central government bears all fiscal expenditures 
and responsibilities, which in turn will also lead to three types of issues. First, it will 
dampen local governments’ initiative. For example, in the early days of modern China, 
the central government took charge of almost everything, leading to the low participation 
of local agents and the low efficiency of (local) public goods’ supply (Qian & Xu, 1993). 
Second, local governments’ information advantage will be wasted, again leading to the 





make it difficult to guarantee the adaptation of public goods’ supply to regional 
differences, since the central government may provide public goods uniformly to all 
regions, thus reducing the welfare and utility of residents. This is especially the case for 
geographically diverse and/or multi-ethnic countries, in which residents from different 
biomes or ethnic groups have different customs, needs, and preferences, so they need 
personalized and differentiated public goods. 
In short, excessive expenditure decentralization is not conducive to adequate macro-economic 
control effect and taking advantage of scale economies, while insufficient expenditure 
decentralization is not conducive to giving full play to the initiative and information advantages 
of local governments. Both situations lead to the decrease of efficiency and the loss of residents’ 
welfare (Janeba & Wilson, 2011; Oates, 1972; Chen et al., 2002; Thiessen, 2003).  
4. Methodology and Data 
4.1 The National Sustainable Development Index 
This paper measures sustainable development by using the National Sustainable 
Development Index (NSDI) previously constructed by Jin et al. (2020). However, because of the 
availability of new data, we make several minor modifications and refinements based on their 
work. Specifically, we introduce “population using at least basic drinking water sources (%)”, 
“population using at least basic sanitary facilities (%)” and “expected years of schooling” for 
indicating drinking water, sanitation facilities, and education, respectively. The upgraded NSDI, 
including 3 dimensions and 12 factors, as shown in columns 1 to 3 in Table 1. 
(1) Economic Dimension of the NSDI 
The expectation is that governments should pursue the goals of relatively high and fair 
income for residents, together with a good potential for economic growth and a reasonable 
economic structure to improve the welfare of the present generation. Accordingly, indicators for 
income level, economic growth, and economic structure need to be set. On the one hand, the 





will affect further development in the future. On the other hand, economic growth and economic 
structure represent the potential for future economic development. These two indicators reflect 
the competitiveness of the country’s economic activities (Kondyli, 2010). This competitiveness 
shapes an economic base that is supported by dynamic local activities.  
Table 1. The Sustainable Development Evaluation Index 










growth Real GDP growth + 
Income level Income index + 
Economic 
structure 






Climate CO2 emissions per capita - 
Air quality PM2.5 - 
Forest Forest area (% of total land area) + 
Arable land Arable land per person + 




Education Expected years of schooling + 
Health Life expectancy index + 
Drinking 
water 
Population using at least basic 
drinking-water sources (%) + 
Sanitation 
facilities  
Population using at least basic 
sanitation facilities (%) + 
Note: The descriptions and data source of the 12 indicators can be found in Appendix Table A1. 
 
(2) Resource and Environmental Dimension of the NSDI 
The utilization of resources and the protection of the environment, through the services 
they provide to society and the economy, have effects on the performance of economic activities 
and on the psychosomatic condition of residents (Kondyli, 2010). Moreover, this dimension of 
sustainability also reflects a welfare guarantee for future generations. Hence, the protection of 
environment and the utilization of resources are important and associated with the preservation 
of their quantitative and qualitative characteristics. The climate and air quality not only reflect 
the living conditions and quality of human beings in the present generation, but also affect that of 





current resources and environmental conditions, affecting the performance of current economic 
activities. In all, these five factors also reflect the insurance of welfare for future generations.  
(3) Social Dimension of the NSDI 
The expectation is that governments should pursue the goal of social fairness providing 
education and health services, as well as basic sanitation and drinking water.  For the members of 
poor families, education is an important channel for their future development, while health care 
services are the basic guarantee for their productive life. Additionally, basic sanitation and 
drinking water are the most basic requirements for human survival. Therefore, the above four 
factors not only reflect on the current level of social welfare, but also represent the consideration 
government provides for social fairness and harmony. 
Jin et al. (2020) calculate the weights of 12 indicators on the basis of the Entropy method 
from basic information theory, which is generally used to calculate the weight of indicators in a 
composite index. Specifically, information is a measure of the degree of order in a system and 
entropy is a measure of the degree of disorder in a system; therefore, the smaller the indicator’s 
entropy, the greater the information provided by the indicator, the greater the effect in the 
comprehensive evaluation, and the higher the weight (Wang et al., 2019). According to Ma et al. 
(2015), the weight calculated by the Entropy method represents the relative rate of change of the 
indicator in the composite indicators system, while the relative level of each indicator should be 
figured by the standardized value of its data. Thus, the Entropy method is an objective weighting 
method that makes weight judgments based on the size of the data information load. It can 
reduce the influence of human subjectivity on the evaluation results and makes those results 
more realistic (Wang et al., 2019; Jin et al., 2020).  





different units with a dimensionless scale from 0 to 1. As shown in Eq. (18), 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 is the indicator j 
of country i, and 𝑥𝑥�𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 is the result of the dimensionless treatment. It should be noted that for some 
indicators, like per capita CO2 emissions, higher values mean a poorer performance of 




            (18) 
𝑥𝑥�𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 1 −
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗−𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗−𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗
           (19) 
Second, by calculating the entropy value of each indicator, as shown in Eq. (20) and Eq. (21), the 
entropy value of each indicator is given by 𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗: 
𝑞𝑞 = 1/ ln(𝑛𝑛)            (20) 
𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗 = −𝑞𝑞∑ 𝑥𝑥�𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑥𝑥�𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1             (21) 
Third, we calculate the information utility value of each indicator, ℎ𝑗𝑗 as: 
ℎ𝑗𝑗 = 1 − 𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗           (22) 
Finally, the weight for indicator j, namely 𝜔𝜔𝑗𝑗, is obtained as shown in Eq. (23). 
𝜔𝜔𝑗𝑗 = ℎ𝑗𝑗/∑ ℎ𝑗𝑗 
𝑝𝑝
𝑗𝑗=1          (23) 
We adopt the NSDI to measure sustainable development for three reasons. Firstly, the 
NSDI includes economic, environmental, and social dimensions, which fits the connotation and 
concept of sustainable development. Secondly, compared with other existing well-known 
indices, like the Human Development Index (HDI), the Human Sustainable Development Index 
(HSDI) (Bravo, 2014) and the Human Green Development Index (HGDI) (Li et al., 2014), the 
NSDI is more complete, comprehensive, and accessible. Thirdly, the weights of indicators in 
NSDI are measured by the Entropy method, which is more objective. 
4.2 Empirical Framework 





use an expanded Barro’s model (1990) that has become the standard approach in the fiscal 
decentralization and economic growth literatures (e.g., Zhang & Zou, 2001; Enikolopov & 
Zhuravskaya, 2007; Canavire-Bacarreza et al., 2020), where our variable of interest is fiscal 
decentralization accompanied by the necessary canonical list of control variables.  
In our empirical analysis, we use several estimation methods. First, we study the effects 
of cross-sectional variation about the fiscal expenditure decentralization and sustainable 
development across countries with the Ordinary Least Square method (OLS). Second, our main 
estimation method to explore the effects of over-time variation about fiscal expenditure 
decentralization and sustainable development across countries is that of panel fixed effects 
regressions (FE), since this method is statistically preferred. Third, we estimate the influential 
effect of over-time variation with panel random effects regressions (RE). Fourth, the LSDV 
(Least Square Dummy Variables) estimate method is used in any case of cross-section correlation 
problems in the model. Finally, because fiscal decentralization is potentially endogenous with 
sustainable development, we also use an IV approach, where our instrument for fiscal 
expenditure decentralization is the Geographic Fragmentation Index (GFI) first introduced by 
Canavire-Bacarreza et al. (2020). 
The base regression model is given by: 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼1 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼3𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼3𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖           (24) 
This paper also uses panel regressions with random effects and fixed effects to estimate the 
effects of over-time variation: 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝜌𝜌 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝜌𝜌 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝜌𝜌 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝜌𝜌 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝜌𝜌 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜌𝜌           (25) 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝜌𝜌 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝜌𝜌 + 𝛾𝛾2𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝜌𝜌 + 𝛾𝛾3𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝜌𝜌 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝜌𝜌 + 𝛾𝛾3𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝜌𝜌 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜌𝜌          (26) 
where i and t indicate countries and years respectively; SD is an index of the sustainable 





square of D to test the inverted U-shaped relationship between fiscal expenditure decentralization 
and sustainable development. X is a set of dummy variables and control variables which will be 
described in detail below. The detailed description and data source of these variables can be 
found in Appendix Table A2. 
4.3 Variables 
(1) Dependent Variables  
Our main interest lies in explaining how the National Sustainable Development Index 
(NSDI) is affected by the level of fiscal decentralization after controlling for other determinants. 
Additionally, we also use the Human Development Index as an alternative dependent variable for 
the robustness check. The definitions of these and the other variables are shown in Table A2 in 
the Appendix. 
(2) Fiscal Expenditure Decentralization 
Our main explanatory variable of interest is the share of subnational expenditures in total 
government expenditures as the measure of fiscal expenditure decentralization. This measure is 
the most widely used in the empirical literature on the effects of fiscal decentralization (e.g., 
Thiessen, 2003; Enikolopov & Zhuravskaya, 2007; Gemmell et al, 2013; Ligthart & 
Oudheusden, 2017; Canavire-Bacarreza et al., 2020). However, this is still an imperfect and 
controversial measure, so it is necessary to state why this measure of expenditure 
decentralization was chosen. 
Several criticisms have been addressed to this GFS-based measure,1 and alternative 
measurements of fiscal decentralization have been suggested. The main criticism is that 
 
1 GFS, which is short for the Government Finance Statistics produced by the International Monetary Fund, uses 
the share of subnational expenditures (or revenues, taxes) in total government expenditures (or revenues, taxes) 
as the measure of fiscal decentralization. With the wide use of this measure in empirical studies, many 





expenditure decentralization does not well capture the real autonomy of subnational 
governments, whose actual level of expenditure decentralization the variable will tend to 
overstate, since they may be restricted or controlled by the central government (Rodden 2004; 
Baskaran & Feld, 2013). Therefore, considerable effort has been dedicated to measuring fiscal 
decentralization in a more precise way; for example, Schneider (2003) and Hooghe et al. (2010) 
construct indices of fiscal decentralization, which strive to account for the actual autonomy of 
subnational governments, and these two indices have been used in a variety of empirical papers 
(e.g., Rodríguez-Pose & Ezcurra, 2011; Baskaran & Feld, 2013). 
However, these fiscal decentralization indices are not panaceas and can also present 
problems in their application for empirical study. One main issue is that the data used in these 
indices are relatively difficult to obtain. Typically, we can only get the required data for a small 
number of countries, most of which are developed countries. Accordingly, the indices are 
commonly used for the empirical study of OECD countries or European Union countries, as is 
the case in Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra (2011), Baskaran and Feld (2013), and Slavinskaitė 
(2017). This issue of data unavailability raises the possibility of a different kind of estimation 
error when the effects of fiscal decentralization in developed countries is generalized to larger 
samples including developing countries. In this regard, alternative measures of fiscal 
decentralization should not only consider its concept and connotation, but also the availability of 
data (Martinez-Vazquez et al., 2017). 
In addition, Ligthart and Oudheusden (2017) have argued that there is no evidence that 
index measures are more effective than other measures nor that they yield more consistent 
results. And, on the other hand, there is no empirical evidence that the GFS-based measure is less 





to systematic measurement error across countries (Enikolopov & Zhuravskaya, 2007; Canavire-
Bacarreza et al., 2020). 
To sum up, we choose the GFS-based measure of expenditure decentralization and accept 
its imperfection, because it allows us to utilize larger samples that include more developing 
countries, and thus helps us obtain empirical results with more general significance. Additionally, 
although we focus on the effect of expenditure decentralization, which is expected to have 
greater bearing on sustainable development, for robustness we will also use a variable measuring 
overall degree of fiscal decentralization including both expenditure and revenue decentralization 
(see Table A2).  
(3) Endogeneity Problem and Instrumental Variables 
 Many past studies of the impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth have 
suffered from an endogeneity problem (Martinez-Vazquez et al., 2017); while fiscal 
decentralization may directly and indirectly affect economic growth, many governments have 
embarked in decentralization reforms in the pursuit of accelerated economic growth. In order to 
address this two-way causal relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth 
past studies have used a verity of techniques including system-GMM and IV approaches 
(Enikolopov & Zhuravskaya, 2007; Kyriacou et al., 2015; Canavire-Bacarreza et al., 2016; 
Ligthart & Oudheusden, 2017).  
In the case of fiscal decentralization and sustainable development we can similarly expect 
the presence of a two-way causal relationship. On the one hand, fiscal decentralization will affect 
economic growth, environmental protection, public health, education, social welfare, and other 
determinants of national sustainable development (Qiao et al., 2005; Fu, 2010; Granado et al, 





development by adjusting their decentralization policies in areas such as health, education, social 
welfare, and so on, leading to the endogeneity problem. 
In order to solve the potential endogeneity of decentralization, we use the Geographic 
Fragmentation Index (GFI) developed by Canavire-Bacarreza et al. (2016) as an instrumental 
variable. The GFI was proved to be a good instrumental variable for empirical research on fiscal 
decentralization (Canavire-Bacarreza et al., 2020). It is not only strongly correlated with fiscal 
decentralization, but it is also an exogenous variable to the economic system. 
The GFI reflects the weighted probability that two individuals taken at random in the 
country do not live in similar altitude zones, with the weight matrix calculated as the average 
distance between altitudes. Thus, the index is simply calculated as:  







j=1              (27) 
where ni
N
 is the share of the population by elevation and wij measures the distance between 
altitude i and altitude j. This measure goes from zero, which corresponds to a case where all the 
population is settled in the same altitude zone, to one which corresponds to the implausible case 
where each person lives at a different altitude. In general, geographical fragmentation will 
increase with the number of altitude-zones. 
The data for the GFI are acquired from NASA’s Earth Observing System Data and 
Information System (EOSDIS) hosted by the Center for International Earth Science Information 
Network (CIESIN) at Columbia University. The data are available for years 1990, 1995, 2000 
and 2010. Since there is low variation in the GFI over time, to address the missing values for 
2001-2005, we assume them to be the same as for 2006-2010. In addition, because the data of 





decentralization as an alternative instrumental variable. 
(4) Control Variables 
First, we control for variables commonly used in the canonical specification in empirical 
research analyzing economic growth issues, namely human capital, population, and openness 
(Levine & Renelt, 1992). Specifically, we adopt the secondary school enrollment rate as the 
measure of human capital (following Thiessen, 2003; Baskaran & Feld, 2013; Ligthart & 
Oudheusden, 2017, among others); population is measured by the natural logarithm of the actual 
population; and openness is measured by the proportion of total import and export trade to total 
GDP (Enikolopov & Zhuravskaya, 2007; Gnegne, 2009; Ligthart & Oudheusden, 2017; 
Canavire-Bacarreza et al., 2020, among others). Within that canonical specification we also 
include democracy, corruption, civil liberty, and ethnolinguistic fractionalization as proxies for 
the institutional environment (as for example in Enikolopov & Zhuravskaya, 2007; Gnegne, 
2009; Reiter & Steensma, 2010; Bodman, 2011; Canavire-Bacarreza et al., 2020). Specifically, 
democracy is measured by the democracy index from Polity IV Dataset; corruption is measured 
by the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Indices from Transparency 
International; civil liberty is from the Freedom House; and ethnic fractionalization is measured 
by the Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization (ELF) Indices (Roeder, 2001). 
Second, even though is not regularly considered in the empirical study of the effects of 
fiscal decentralization, we control for government size as measured by the revenue to GDP ratio. 
Fiscal decentralization is generally constrained by the government’s financial capacity (Bodman, 
2011; Kneller et al., 1999), and if fiscal decentralization leads to a lower public sector size 
(because of the increased competition among levels of administration) and there is a negative 





estimation (Gemmell et al., 2013).  
Third, we control for the dependence on natural resources, measured by the share natural 
resources rent in GDP, since their presence is likely to affect sustainable development (Pardi et 
al., 2015). Revenues from natural resources such as fossil fuels and minerals can make up a 
significant proportion of GDP, but their exploitation in the present will not only lower future 
development and living standards but it is also likely to cause environmental pollution and 
ecosystem damage (Koirala & Pradhan, 2019).  
Last, we introduce time and region dummy variables to avoid the missing variable 
problems caused by time or region differences (Ligthart & Oudheusden, 2017). The regional 
dummy variables are created following the World Bank’s conventional division.2  
4.4 Data 
Given the existing data information constraints, we put together a panel of 52 countries 
(see Table A3 in the Appendix for the complete list), which includes 20 developed countries and 
32 developing countries, mainly distributed in six regions, namely Europe & Central Asia, Latin 
America & Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa, North America, East Asia & Pacific, and Middle 
East & North Africa. Two main considerations determined the selection of countries in the 
sample: (i) ensuring data integrity of the NSDI, meaning that the selected countries must have 
accurate data for 10 or more indicators; and (ii) confirming the selected countries have data for 
expenditure decentralization and other control variables.  
In order to explore the short-run and long-run effects of expenditure decentralization on 
sustainable development, this paper uses two samples, as follows: 
 
2 Namely, Europe & Central Asia, Latin America & Caribbean, East Asia & Pacific, Sub-Saharan Africa, North 





 (1) Sample for Short-Run Effect (2010-2016) 
This sample is a panel (time-series cross-country) dataset for 52 countries in the period of 
2010-2016, which allows us to control for unobserved sources of country differences. Due to 
some missing data about variables in this period for some countries, we adopt different 
complementary methods,3 but fortunately, there are not many missing data in this sample. The 
summary statistics of this sample are shown in Table A4 in the Appendix. 
 (2) Sample for Long-Run Effect (1991-2015) 
For this longer panel we average the values for five-year periods to smooth the data over 
the macroeconomic cycle, and to allow us to explore the long-run effects (Canavire-Bacarreza et 
al., 2020), Therefore we get a cross-country panel data covering five periods, namely 1991-1995, 
1996-2000, 2001-2005, 2006-2010 and 2011-2015. As the time span of this sample is relatively 
large and there are more cases of missing data, we add an interpolation method based on three 
methods above;4 however, in some cases we are not able to interpolate and thus we end up with a 
slightly unbalanced panel data set. The summary statistics for this sample are reported also in 
Table A4 in the Appendix. 
5. Results 
5.1 Measurement of the NSDI  
 
3 Specifically, we use first the mean value interpolation method. For example, if the data of 2010 and 2012 are 
available, but the data of 2011 is missing, we use the average value of 2010 and 2012 to replace the value of 
2011. Second, the nearest neighbor interpolation method. This method is used to deal with missing data for the 
variables that are very stable over time, like the natural logarithm of total population. Third, the clustering mean 
interpolation method. The missing value is supplemented by the mean value of the region or organization to 
which the country belongs. 
4 If data for a variable is partially missing in a certain period (5 years), for example, there are only 3 years of 
data, we take the average value of these 3 years as the data of this period. Specifically, in the period of 2006-
2010, Turkey has only fiscal expenditure decentralization data in 2008, 2009 and 2010, thus we use the average 
value of these three years as the average value of this period. Since this method is done over a long period of 
time and across all countries, it does not raise any major problems. In addition, for some variables with serious 
missing data issues, we do not make any supplement or modification. For example, the expenditure 






This paper measures the NSDI and its variation about 52 countries (see Appendix Figures 
A1 and A2). As the Appendix Table A5 shows, the weights for the economic dimension, social 
dimension, and resource-environmental dimension respectively account for 24.60%, 23.93% and 
51.46%. The sum of the weights of the economic and social dimensions is almost equal to the 
weights of the resource-environmental dimensions, the latter more closely representing the 
concept and essence of sustainable development. These weights of three dimensions reflect the 
welfare of the present and future generations is equally important. 
Figure A1 shows the measuring result of NSDI covering 5 periods from 1991-2015. If the 
sample countries are ranked by the average value of NSDI in these five periods, the top five 
countries are Sweden (0.717), Australia (0.698), Canada (0.681), Iceland (0.660) and Norway 
(0.659), and the bottom five countries are United Arab Emirates (0.445), China (0.402), Kiribati 
(0.387), Mongolia (0.381) and Afghanistan (0.292). In this period, the ten countries with the 
largest growth rate of NSDI are Azerbaijan (0.116), Moldova (0.114), Kiribati (0.108), Romania 
(0.096), Lithuania (0.090), Latvia (0.090), Afghanistan (0.086), Armenia (0.078), Estonia 
(0.077), and China (0.074). It means that the level of sustainable development in China, Kiribati, 
and Afghanistan is low but has been greatly improved during this period.  
Figure A2 shows the NSDI covering the recent 7 years from 2010-2016. Similarly, we 
rank these countries according to the average value of NSDI in this period. The top five countries 
still are Sweden (0.722), Australia (0.691), Iceland (0.671), Canada (0.661), and Norway (0.642), 
but the order has changed. The bottom five countries are same as for the larger sample above, 
namely United Arab Emirates (0.431), Kiribati (0.391), China (0.385), Mongolia (0.326), and 
Afghanistan (0.245). In this period, the ten countries with the largest growth rate of NSDI are 





(0.050), Latvia (0.047), Iceland (0.043), Lithuania (0.042), Spain (0.041), and Australia (0.039).  
Overall, the measurement of NSDI shows distinct characteristics in economic level and 
geographical distribution. First, the high NSDI countries tend to be developed countries mainly 
in Europe and North America, while the countries with lower NSDI are all developing countries 
mainly in Asia and Africa. Second, the NSDI is also relatively low in those rich Middle East 
countries, because of their low score in the resource and environmental dimension. This result is 
similar with alternative measures such as the HSDI (Bravo, 2014) and the HGDI (Li et al., 2014). 
 
5.2 Short-Run Effect  
Figure 1 gives a first impression of the relationship between expenditure decentralization 
and sustainable development. As Figure 1a shows, there is a hump-shaped relationship between 
expenditure decentralization and NSDI when we have not yet introduced the control variables 
and expenditure decentralization square term. However, Figure 1a can only provide a conjecture 
or hypothesis of a hump-shaped relationship. In Figures 1b and 1c, the x-axis respectively 
represents “Expenditure Decentralization” and “Square Expenditure Decentralization.” Figures 
1b and 1c show that, after bringing the expenditure decentralization square term and all the 
control variables into the model, there is a positive correlation between expenditure 
decentralization and NSDI, and a negative correlation between expenditure decentralization 
square and NSDI. It means: (i) there is a hump-shaped relationship between expenditure 
decentralization and NSDI, even after controlling for the other relevant variables; and (ii) it 
further supports the conjecture or hypothesis in Figure 1a. However, the hump-shaped 
relationship between expenditure decentralization and sustainable development in the short run 
still needs to be tested empirically. 





   
 (a) Without control variable  (b) With control variables (c) With control variables 
We start with the OLS, FE, and RE estimations for empirical analysis of the short-run 
sample (as Table 2 shows). While some of these estimation methods are likely biased, we still 
include all of them: (1) to compare with each other and select the most suitable estimation 
method for our sample, and (2) to compare the coefficients of various methods and discuss the 
potential direction of bias.  
The results of OLS estimation are reported in the second and third columns of Table 2. 
The results of Model 1.1 show that the coefficients of expenditure decentralization and 
expenditure decentralization square are 0.435 and -0.529 respectively, and both pass the 
significance test at the level of 1%. Model 1.2 introduces time dummy variables and regional 
dummy variables based on Model 1.1. Its results show that the coefficients of expenditure 
decentralization and expenditure decentralization square are significantly positive and negative 
respectively, and the absolute values of the two coefficients are smaller than those of Model 1.1. 
It means that our models may miss some variables that affect national sustainable development, 
and these missing variables are related to time and region. For example, since the temperature in 
different latitudes is different, the consumption of fossil energy and carbon dioxide emissions are 
also different, and these are factors affecting the sustainable development. Therefore, we need to 
control the time and region dummies to solve the estimation bias caused by missing variables to 
the extent possible. In addition, it should be noted that these empirical results need to be treated 





Model 1.3 and Model 1.4 show that the coefficients of expenditure decentralization and 
expenditure decentralization square are significantly positive and negative respectively, and the 
absolute values of two coefficients are obviously reduced compared with Model 1.1 and Model 
1.2. This means that the time effect and individual effect will cause the estimation bias of 
regression results in these models and indicates that the two-way FE estimation is preferred. In 
addition, the F-test values of model 1.3 and model 1.4 are 215.25 and 391.58 respectively, which 
further indicates that FE estimation is more suitable for this sample than OLS estimation. It 
should be noted that the indicators used to measure ethnic fractionalization, corruption, and civil 
liberties change very little over time, so they are not brought into the FE estimation.5  
Having found evidence of the need for a panel effects approach, we need to make a 
choice between FE and RE models using the Hausman test. However, the Hausman test will fail 
if the model has cross-section correlation problems; therefore, we have to test the cross-section 
correlation first. Three cross-section correlation test methods are widely used, namely Pesaran’s 
test, Friedman’s test, and Free’s test, all of which have different applicable conditions. Among 
them, Free’s test is the most suitable, because the data are balanced panel data and the time effect 
needs to be considered in this model. The result of Free’s test shows that the model has a cross-
section correlation problem. To handle this situation, we perform an auxiliary regression 
estimation and then conduct a joint significance test for the deviation of all within-subject 
variables. In fact, this test can be seen as is an enhanced version of the Hausman test which could 
be called the “robust Hausman test”. As the result of robust Hausman test shows, the estimation 
gap between FE and RE is too large, which indicates that FE results are consistent while RE 
 
5 These are measured by the Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Index, Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, 
and the level of civil liberties (see Appendix Table A2), and see Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007) and Canavire-Bacarreza et 






results are biased, so FE should be selected. 
Table 2. Regression Results in the Short Run Sample (2010-2016), NSDI 
 (1.1) (1.2) (1.3) (1.4) (1.5) (1.6) (1.7) (1.8) 
 OLS FE RE LSDV FE2SLS EC2SLS 
Expenditure 
Decent. 
0.435*** 0.371*** 0.221*** 0.128*** 0.096** 0.128*** 0.128*** 0.115** 
(0.055) (0.055) (0.064) (0.048) (0.047) (0.026) (0.031) (0.041) 
Expenditure 
Decent.2 
-0.529*** -0.444*** -0.285*** -0.205** -0.148** -0.205*** -0.263*** -0.271*** 
(0.068) (0.071) (0.105) (0.079) (0.073) (0.057) (0.066) (0.080) 
Government 
size 
-0.149*** -0.106*** 0.027** 0.003 0.002 0.003 -0.007 -0.009 
(0.023) (0.022) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.017) (0.011) (0.012) 
Human capital 0.080
*** 0.086*** 0.024*** -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 0.004 0.002 
(0.019) (0.018) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.010) (0.007) 
Population -0.007
*** -0.008*** -0.139*** -0.055** 0.002 -0.055** -0.038 -0.002 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.029) (0.025) (0.005) (0.015) (0.031) (0.004) 
Openness -0.023
*** -0.020*** -0.009 -0.012* -0.009 -0.012* -0.010 -0.004 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) 
Dependence on 
nat. resources 
-0.237*** -0.214*** -0.069** 0.034 0.039* 0.034 0.044* 0.051** 




-0.036*** -0.037***   0.017 0.429***  0.007 
(0.014) (0.014)   (0.038) (0.176)  (0.031) 
Democracy -0.002 -0.006
*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001*** -0.001** -0.001* 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Corruption 0.015
*** 0.019***   0.022*** 0.151***  0.024*** 
(0.002) (0.002)   (0.006) (0.028)  (0.005) 
Civil Liberties 0.001
* 0.001*   0.001 0.012**  0.001 
(0.000) (0.000)   (0.001) (0.004)  (0.001) 
Constant 0.511
*** 0.509*** -1.715*** 1.454*** 0.367***  1.157*** 0.354*** 
(0.049) (0.043) (0.465) (0.406) (0.093)  (0.253) (0.048) 
Time dummy No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummy No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.668 0.760 - -  0.994   
F 64.36*** 48.94*** 215.25*** 391.58***  934.55*** 204.18***  
Wald       605.62*** 447.76*** 
Robust Hausman    29.19***    
No. of countries 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 
Observations 364 364 364 364 364 364 312 312 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
As mentioned above, there is a cross-section correlation problem in FE, so we use LSDV 
estimation to solve this problem (see Model 1.6). The coefficients of expenditure 
decentralization and expenditure decentralization square are 0.128 and -0.205 respectively, 
which are consistent with the coefficients in Model 1.4, and significant at the level of 1% and 





potential endogeneity problem. 
Last, in order to address the endogeneity problem, we use FE2SLS and EC2SLS 
approaches with the lag period of expenditure decentralization as an instrumental variable. The 
result of FE2SLS as Model 1.7 shows, the coefficients of expenditure decentralization and 
expenditure decentralization square are 0.128 and -0.263 respectively, which are close to the 
results of Models 1.4 and 1.6. The EC2SLS, an error corrected IV-approach, can be used to 
estimate the variable which does not change with time as an improved scheme of FE2SLS. Both 
the results of FE2SLS and EC2SLS show that the effect of expenditure decentralization on 
sustainable development is hump-shaped in short term. 
Additionally, we can also observe the results for some control variables in Models 1.6, 
1.7, and 1.8. Population growth and trade openness have a significant negative correlation with 
the NSDI in the short term. There is a significant positive correlation between ethnic 
fractionalization and NSDI. The rest of the control variables are statistically insignificant. 
5.3 Long-Run Effect 
Figure 2 shows the scatter plot and regression line in the long-run sample. Figure 2a is 
the scatter plot and regression line without control variables, b and c are the scatter plots and 
regression lines after regression estimation with control variables. This figure preliminarily 
validates our basic hypothesis. By comparing Figure 2 and Figure 1, it can be seen that the 
scatter plot in the long-run sample is much looser than that of short-run sample, which may be 
because of the fewer observations and more missing values in long-run sample (see Appendix 
Table A4). In addition, the slope of regression lines in Figure 2 is not steep as that in Figure 1, 
which may be because the long-run sample helps to smooth the data over the macroeconomic 





Figure 2. The Relationships of NSDI and Expenditure Decent. in the Long-Run Sample 
   
(a) Without control variable (b) With control variables (c) With control variables 
We also employ OLS, RE, and FE to estimate the long-run impact of expenditure 
decentralization on sustainable development (results as Table 3 presents). Our interest is to find 
the most suitable estimation method for the long-run sample, but also to be able to compare the 
long-run and short-run effects of expenditure decentralization on sustainable development. 
The F-test values again indicate that two-way FE estimation is better than OLS 
estimation for the long-run sample. Before the further selection between FE and RE, it is 
necessary to examine the cross-section correlation problems of the models. The Pesaran’s test 
and Free’s test both need to be used for the cross-section correlation test, because the data used in 
the models is not strongly balanced panel data. The test results confirm the presence of cross-
section correlation problems, so the robust Hausman test is used to compare FE and RE. Finally, 




Table 3. Regression Results in the Long-Run Sample (1991-2015), NSDI 
 (2.1) (2.2) (2.3) (2.4) (2.5) (2.6) (2.7) (2.8) 
 OLS OLS FE FE RE LSDV FE2SLS EC2SLS 
Expenditure 
Decent. 
0.363*** 0.319*** 0.192** 0.106** 0.085** 0.106** 0.748*** 0.669*** 





Note: Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
The LSDV estimation is also used in Model 2.6 to solve the cross-section correlation 
problem. The result of Model 2.6 reports that the coefficients of expenditure decentralization and 
expenditure decentralization square are 0.106 and -0.167 respectively, which are significant at 
the level of 5%. It should be noted that the absolute values of the coefficients of expenditure 
decentralization and expenditure decentralization square in Model 2.6 are smaller than those in 
Model 1.6 and the significance level is not as good as that in Model 1.6. The first reason for this 
situation is the issue of missing data. There are many missing values in the long-run sample (see 
Appendix Table A4), and the data are not a strongly balanced panel. Second, short-run economic 
Expenditure 
Decent.2 
-0.453*** -0.417*** -0.251* -0.167* -0.134** -0.167** -0.858*** -0.968*** 
(0.114) (0.113) (0.163) (0.101) (0.063) (0.067) (0.239) (0.268) 
Government 
size 
-0.103** -0.058 0.136*** 0.132*** 0.108*** 0.132*** 0.163*** 0.058** 
(0.041) (0.038) (0.040) (0.024) (0.024) (0.019) (0.057) (0.040) 
Human capital 0.108
*** 0.099*** 0.081*** 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.024 0.040 
(0.030) (0.027) (0.017) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.019) (0.020) 
Population -0.006 -0.007
** -0.061*** -0.052*** -0.003 -0.052*** -0.053** -0.057*** 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.020) (0.014) (0.005) (0.011) (0.025) (0.016) 
Openness -0.026
** -0.022** 0.058*** 0.014** 0.015** 0.014** 0.006 0.004 
(0.011) (0.010) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.014) (0.009) 
Dependence on 
nat. resources 
-0.131* -0.147** 0.019 -0.031 -0.040 -0.031 0.106 0.016 




-0.012 -0.028   0.013 0.142***  -0.026 
(0.019) (0.018)   (0.038) (0.023)  (0.032) 
Democracy -0.000 -0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
*** 0.001 0.001 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Corruption 0.015
*** 0.018***   0.020*** 0.074***  0.025*** 
(0.004) (0.003)   (0.006) (0.012)  (0.006) 
Civil Liberties -0.000 -0.000   -0.001 0.011
***  0.002** 
(0.001) (0.001)   (0.001) (0.004)  (0.001) 
Constant 0.526
*** 0.509*** -0.617* 1.282*** 0.404***  1.201*** 0.446*** 
(0.069) (0.058) (0.320) (0.226) (0.090)  (0.408) (0.090) 
Time dummy No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummy No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.531 0.700    0.993   




Robust Hausman    35.413***    
No. of countries 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 





fluctuation disturbs the estimation results, because it also affects the national sustainable 
development. If a country has severe macroeconomic fluctuations in a short period, this is 
obviously not conducive to national sustainable development. For example, the international 
financial crisis that started in 2008 affected the macroeconomic stability of most countries in the 
world, leading to many problems that restrict national sustainable development, such as the 
decline of GDP, the rise of the unemployment rate, the increase of social instability factors, etc. 
To solve the endogeneity problem in the long-run sample, we use FE2SLS and EC2SLS 
approaches with the GFI as the instrumental variable. The results of FE2SLS and EC2SLS are as 
Models 2.7 and 2.8 show, the coefficients of expenditure decentralization and expenditure 
decentralization square are positive and negative respectively, and both pass the significance test 
of 1%. By comparing the results of FE, LSDV, and 2SLS, we find that there is a significant 
hump-shaped relationship between expenditure decentralization and sustainable development in 
the long run and the empirical results are very robust, meaning that our basic hypothesis has been 
well tested in long-run samples too. 
Additionally, we can also observe the results for some control variables in Models 2.6, 
2.7, and 2.8. Government size, human capital, and civil liberties have significant positive 
correlations with NSDI in the long-run sample, but these are not significant in the short-run 
sample. Population and corruption have significant negative correlations with sustainable 
development in the long-run sample. Note that corruption is measured by the Transparency 
International Corruption Perceptions Indices, with higher values corresponding to lower levels of 
corruption. The other control variables are not significant. 
5.4 Robustness Checks 





decentralization, so as to account for both expenditure and revenue decentralization, as an 
alternative independent variable. The overall degree of fiscal decentralization is measured by the 
weighted average value of the share of subnational expenditure in total government expenditure 
and the share of subnational revenue in total government revenue.  
In the second robustness check, we adopt the HDI (Human Development Index) as an 
alternative dependent variable for measuring sustainable development. The NSDI is a relatively 
complete and systematic index for measuring sustainable development, but it is newer and less 
tested. The HDI is reported annually as part of the Human Development Report of UNDP 
(United Nations Development Programme) and has gradually been used widely as a 
sustainability assessment index due to its simple composition and rich connotation (Bilbao-
Ubillos, 2013; Li et al., 2014). 
Considering the potential presence of endogeneity and the limited space to replicate the 
entire analysis, we directly use EC2SLS estimation to carry out the robustness check (see Table 
4). The results of the first robustness check approach are reported in Models 3.1 and 3.2 in Table 
4, which confirm that the overall degree of fiscal decentralization is hump-shaped related with 
NSDI both in the short term or long term. Models 3.3 and 3.4 report the results of the second 
robustness check approach. These two models also show a hump-shaped relationship between 
expenditure decentralization and HDI. These results not only support our theoretical analysis, but 
also show that the empirical results in Tables 2 and 3 are robust.  
 
 
Table 4. Robustness Checks, EC2SLS 





Overall Level of FD HDI as Dependent Variable  
 NSDI HDI  
 Short-run Long-run Short-run Long-run 
 (3.1) (3.2) (3.3) (3.4) 
Expenditure 
Decentralization 
  0.131** 0.284** 
  (0.050) (0.123) 
Expenditure 
Decentralization2 
  -0.226** -0.381** 
  (0.080) (0.183) 
Fiscal 
Decentralization 
0.222** 0.635**   
(0.104) (0.303)   
Fiscal 
Decentralization2 
-0.345** -0.996**   
(0.144) (0.420)   
Government size 0.021 0.020 0.007 -0.182
*** 
(0.016) (0.059) (0.007) (0.027) 
Human capital 0.010 0.033
** 0.033*** 0.164*** 
(0.010) (0.016) (0.006) (0.021) 
Population -0.002 -0.012 0.008
** 0.008** 
(0.005) (0.009) (0.004) (0.003) 
Openness -0.001 0.010 0.001 0.015
* 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) 
Dependence on 
natural resources 
0.066*** 0.027 -0.029** 0.153*** 
(0.024) (0.071) (0.014) (0.045) 
Ethnic 
Fractionalization 
-0.004 -0.024 -0.045* -0.099*** 
(0.037) (0.054) (0.027) (0.014) 
Democracy -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.005
** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Corruption 0.024
*** 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.025*** 
(0.006) (0.009) (0.004) (0.003) 
Civil Liberties 0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.001
*** 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) 
Constant 0.402
*** 0.553*** 0.489*** 0.335*** 
(0.095) (0.136) (0.066) (0.054) 
Time dummy YES YES YES YES 
Region dummy YES YES YES YES 
Wald 381.40*** 435.34*** 602.30*** 780.31*** 
Number of countries 52 52 52 52 
Observations 302 181 312 183 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
5.5 Estimation of the Optimal Level of Expenditure Decentralization 
This paper brings expenditure decentralization and expenditure decentralization square 
into the model simultaneously, which is a common method to test a U-shaped relationship in 
empirical research. However, Lind and Mehlum (2010) have questioned this method. They find 
that when the real relationship between independent and dependent variables is “convex and 





relationship could not be guaranteed with this traditional empirical method, because the presence 
of just a “convex and monotonous” relationship is also possible. Lind and Mehlum (2010) put 
forward a new method to test a U-shaped (or inverted U-shaped) relationship by simulating the 
relationship curve of two variables as well the extreme point, then verifying the correlation of the 
curves on both sides of the extreme point.  
The Lind-Mehlum method has two advantages over the traditional method of fitting a 
quadratic form. First, it can make up for the defects of the traditional empirical method and 
accurately test whether the two variables are related in a U-shaped (or inverted U-shaped) 
relationship or rather just have a “convex and monotonous” relationship. Second, it can easily be 
used to estimate the minimum point of the simulated U-shaped curve or the maximum point of 
simulated inverted U-shaped curve; hence, it can be used to estimate the optimal level of 
expenditure decentralization.  
Table 5. The Estimation of the Optimal Expenditure Decentralization 
Model SD U-Shape Lower Bound Slope Upper Bound Slope Optimal point 
1.6 NSDI Yes 0.127*** -0.223*** 0.311 
1.7 NSDI Yes 0.127*** -0.312*** 0.309 
1.8 NSDI Yes 0.118** -0.325*** 0.315 
2.6 NSDI Yes 0.084** -0.121* 0.319 
2.7 NSDI Yes 0.741*** -0.715*** 0.335 
2.8 NSDI Yes 0.661*** -0.981*** 0.345 
3.3 HDI Yes 0.145** -0.278** 0.381 
3.4 HDI Yes 0.280** -0.366** 0.395 
Note: (1) * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. (2) SD indicates the sustainable development 
metric, for which NSDI and HDI are both used in this paper. 
In particular, we employ the Lind-Mehlum method to test Models 1.6-1.8, 2.6-2.8, and 
3.3-3.4 for the presence of an inverted U-shaped relationship and also to estimate the optimal 
degree of expenditure decentralization. The U-shaped test results in Columns 3-5 of Table 5 
show that expenditure decentralization has an inverted U-shaped relationship with NSDI and 





each model. When sustainable development is measured by the NSDI, the optimal expenditure 
decentralization levels in the short-term and long-term samples are between 0.309 and 0.345. 
When sustainable development is measured by the HDI, the optimal expenditure decentralization 
levels in the short-term and long-term samples are 0.381 and 0.395, respectively. Not only are 
the optimal points quite similar, but the differences can be easily explained by the content of the 
two indexes: while NSDI includes economic, resource, environmental, and social dimensions, 
the HDI mainly considers the social-economic dimension. 
Despite the quantitative precision of the estimates in Table 5, we need to be reminded that 
the optimal expenditure decentralization level is not a static and absolute proposition, but rather a 
dynamic one, responding to the actual conditions and the economic development of a country. 
First, a country’s actual conditions must be considered to determine the optimal degree of 
expenditure decentralization. In particular, country size is an important determinant of fiscal 
decentralization (Panizza, 1999; Arzaghi & Henderson, 2005; Enikolopov & Zhuravskaya, 
2007). The larger the country size, the farther apart the residents and administrative center will 
be, and therefore the more powers need to be allocated to local governments to manage their 
affairs far away from the center. In the same direction, Baskaran and Feld (2013) and Ligthart 
and Oudheusden (2017) suggest that Federal countries need to allocate more power to local 
governments than Unitary countries. Panizza (1999) and Canavire-Bacarreza et al. (2020) also 
show that the higher the degree of ethnic fractionalization, the more fiscal decentralization is 
needed. Jilek (2018) points out that population and country size jointly affect fiscal 
decentralization, which means that countries with higher population density need higher degrees 
of fiscal decentralization. Therefore, at the least, the determination of the optimal expenditure 





fractionalization, population density, and other actual conditions. 
Second, the economic development level of the country must be considered to determine 
the optimal degree of expenditure decentralization regarding the NSDI and HDI, as reflected in 
the results in Table 5. In fact, as we have seen, the NSDI and HDI imply different development 
policies and goals. The NSDI includes 12 indicators of economic, environmental, and social 
dimensions, which implies comprehensive development policy and goals in all aspects. By 
contrast, the HDI only includes economic and social indicators, which makes many rich 
countries with high energy consumption and high emissions also be identified as high HDI 
countries. In fact, this is one of the important reasons why the HDI is a controversial measure of 
sustainable development. Clearly, the optimal expenditure decentralization level under the 
guidance of different development policy objectives will be, and has been empirically found to 
be (Table 5), different. For example, a country in the initial development stage may adopt a 
development policy with economic growth as the main goal and carry out decentralization 
reforms to narrowly promote economic growth, which has happened in many developing 
countries. 
6. Conclusion 
The key finding in this paper is that fiscal expenditure decentralization has a hump-
shaped relationship with sustainable development, implying that there is an optimal degree of 
expenditure decentralization. In this paper, we first theoretically introduce the expenditure of 
central government and sub-national government into Barro’s model (1990) and derive a hump-
shaped relationship between expenditure and sustainable development as well as the optimal 
expenditure decentralization level. Second, we empirically validate this hump-shaped 
relationship both in the short and long runs in relation to the National Sustainable Development 





of estimation approaches and the Geographic Fragmentation Index as an instrumental variable. 
Our empirical results are robust to alternative specifications, namely the Human Development 
Index instead of the NSDI and the use of the overall degree of fiscal decentralization rather than 
just that of expenditure decentralization. Finally, we estimate the optimal level of expenditure 
decentralization with the Lind-Mehlum method.  
These finding have some tentative policy implications. The hump-shaped relationship 
implies that excessive expenditure decentralization will weaken the macro-control ability of a 
central government and the scale effect of public goods’ supply, while insufficient expenditure 
decentralization will restrain the benefits from autonomy and the diverse initiatives of local 
governments. These two situations both reduce the efficiency of public goods’ supply and 
residents’ welfare, undermining national sustainable development. However, there is no universal 
degree of optimal decentralization since policymakers must consider the development level of 
the country and its actual conditions along several dimensions such as country size, population 
density, ethnic diversity, and so on, when calculating that country’s optimal decentralization.  
In short, policymakers need to calibrate the appropriate level of expenditure 
decentralization to achieve sustainable development. For countries with insufficient expenditure 
decentralization, further fiscal decentralization reform is called for. For countries with excessive 
expenditure decentralization, the recentralization of government’s expenditure and 
responsibilities is called for. Although examples of the former may be more common, there are 
also examples of the latter. For example, in China, the share of sub-national government 
expenditure is higher than 85 percent in recent years, which likely means excessive expenditure 
decentralization, with marked emphasis on infrastructure spending for regional economic growth 





thereby eroding sustainable development. As to what degree of decentralization is appropriate for 
China or any other specific country, the question will need further study considering the current 
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Table A1. The Descriptions and Data Sources of the 12 Indicators in NSDI 
Indicator Description Source 
GDP Growth Real GDP growth. World Bank 
Income 
index 
According to Atkinson (1970), calculating the income index can reflect 
fairness and equality, in the case of unequal distribution factors, based 
on the disposable income or consumption of per capita family. The 
higher the income index is, the better the economic situation of the 





(% of total 
employment) 
The proportion of employments of the tertiary industry in total 





It refers to the CO2 emission generated by the combustion of energy 
such as coal, oil, natural gas and so on (Unit: ton per person). IEA 
PM2.5 
It represents the concentration of fine suspended particles with a 
diameter less than 2.5 microns in the atmosphere, which can penetrate 






The forest coverage rate is the proportion of forest area in the total land 
area. While the forest area refers to the land covered by upright trees (at 




Arable land includes temporary crop land (double cropping rice field is 
calculated once), temporary grassland for mowing or pasture, market or 
kitchen garden land and temporary fallow land, but excludes the land 






It refers to the proportion of renewable energy consumption in total 
energy consumption. The higher the proportion is, the more conducive 






Expected year of education (unit: years). Number of years of schooling 
that a child of school entrance age can expect to receive if prevailing 






According to Atkinson (1970), calculating the life expectancy index can 
reflect fairness and equality, in the case of unequal distribution factors, 
based on the data of UN life table. The higher the index value, the better 
the health status of residents, the more equal and fairer the access to 
health for residents. 
UNDP 
Population 




The population that drinks water from an improved source, provided 
collection time is not more than 30 minutes for a round trip. This 
indicator encompasses people using basic drinking-water services as 
well as those using safely managed drinking-water services. Improved 






sources (%) dug wells, protected springs, and packaged or delivered water. 
Population 




Percentage of the population using at least basic sanitation services, that 
is, improved sanitation facilities that are not shared with other 
households. This indicator encompasses people using basic sanitation 
services as well as those using safely managed sanitation services. 
Improved sanitation facilities include flush/pour flush toilets connected 
to piped sewer systems, septic tanks or pit latrines; pit latrines with 
slabs (including ventilated pit latrines); and composting toilets. 
WHO 
Note: the UNDP, IEA, and WHO are short for the United Nations Development Program, the 
International Energy Agency, and the World Health Organization, respectively.  
 
 
Table A2. Description and Sources of Variables used in Regressions 
Variable Description Source 
NSDI 
The National Sustainable Development Index constructed by 
Jin et al. (2020). Its value ranges from 0 to 1, with higher 
values corresponding to better performance in national 
comprehensive sustainable development. 
See Table A1 
Eco_NSDI The sub-index of NSDI in economic dimension. See Table A1 
RE_NSDI The sub-index of NSDI in resource and environmental dimension. See Table A1 
Social_NSDI The sub-index of NSDI in social dimension. See Table A1 
HDI 
The Human Development Index. Its value ranges from 0 to 1, 
with higher values corresponding to better performance in 




Share of subnational expenditure in total government 
expenditure (%).  IMF-GFS 
Fiscal 
decentralization 
The overall degree of fiscal decentralization in expenditure 
and revenue. The average value of the share of subnational 
expenditure in total government expenditure and the share of 





The GFI reflects the weighted probability that two individuals 
taken at random in the country do not live in similar altitude 
zones, with the weight matrix calculated as the average 




Government size Share of fiscal revenue in GDP (%).  IMF-GFS 
Human capital Secondary school enrollment (% gross).  World Bank 
Population Natural logarithm of actual population. World Bank 
Openness The share of export and import in GDP (%). UNCTAD 
Dependence on 
natural resources 
The share of total natural resources rents in GDP (%). Total 
natural resources rents are the sum of oil rents, natural gas 
rents, coal rents (hard and soft), mineral rents, and forest 
rents. The higher the value, the more dependent the country 
is on natural resources. 
World Bank 





Fractionalization 1985. Its value ranges from 0 to 1. (2001) 




The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions 
Indices for year 2008. Its value ranges from 0 to 10, with 




The level of civil liberties. Civil liberties allow for the freedoms 
of expression and belief, associational and organizational 
rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy without 
interference from the state. Its value ranges from 0 to 6, with 




In the sample of short-run effect, time dummies are created 
by the years from 2010 to 2016. In the sample of long-run 
effect, time dummies are created by 5 periods, namely 1991-
1995, 1996-2000, 2001-2005, 2006-2010, 2011-2015. 
— 
Region dummy 
Scale from 1 to 6, respectively represents Europe & Central 
Asia, Latin America & Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa, North 
America, East Asia & Pacific, Middle East & North Africa. 
World Bank 
Note: (1) the UNCTAD is short for the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 
(2) The Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Indices could be found: 
http://weber.ucsd.edu/~proeder/elf.htm. (3) The Transparency International Corruption 
Perceptions Indices could be found: http://www.gwdg.de/~uwvw/. 
 
Table A3. Sample of Countries by Development Level and Region 
Country Region DC Country Region DC 
Afghanistan Middle East & North Africa N South Korea East Asia & Pacific Y 
Albania Europe & Central Asia N Latvia Europe & Central Asia N 
Armenia Europe & Central Asia N Lithuania Europe & Central Asia N 
Australia East Asia & Pacific Y North Macedonia Europe & Central Asia N 
Austria Europe & Central Asia Y Malta Europe & Central Asia Y 
Azerbaijan Europe & Central Asia N Mauritius Sub-Saharan Africa N 
Belarus Europe & Central Asia N Moldova Europe & Central Asia N 
Belgium Europe & Central Asia Y Mongolia East Asia & Pacific N 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Europe & Central Asia N Myanmar East Asia & Pacific N 
Brazil Latin America & Caribbean N Netherlands Europe & Central Asia Y 
Canada North America Y New Zealand East Asia & Pacific Y 
Chile Latin America & Caribbean N Norway Europe & Central Asia Y 
China East Asia & Pacific N Paraguay Latin America & Caribbean N 






Costa Rica Latin America & Caribbean N Romania Europe & Central Asia N 
El Salvador Latin America & Caribbean N 
Russian 
Federation Europe & Central Asia N 
Estonia Europe & Central Asia Y South Africa Sub-Saharan Africa N 
Georgia Europe & Central Asia N Spain Europe & Central Asia Y 
Germany Europe & Central Asia Y Sweden Europe & Central Asia Y 
Honduras Latin America & Caribbean N Switzerland Europe & Central Asia Y 
Hungary Europe & Central Asia Y Thailand East Asia & Pacific N 
Iceland Europe & Central Asia Y Turkey Europe & Central Asia N 
Israel Middle East & North Africa Y Ukraine Europe & Central Asia N 
Japan East Asia & Pacific Y United Arab Emirates 
Middle East & North 
Africa N 
Kazakhstan Europe & Central Asia N United Kingdom Europe & Central Asia Y 
Kiribati East Asia & Pacific N United States North America Y 
Note: DC indicates whether it is a developed country, according to the standards of CIA’s the 
World Fact Book and IMF, where Y is short for yes and N is short for no. 
 
 
Table A4. Summary Statistics 
Variables Sample of Short-Run Effect  (2010-2016) 
Sample of Long-Run Effect 
 (1991-2015) 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
NSDI 364 0.54 0.09 260 0.55 0.09 
Eco_NSDI 364 0.15 0.04 260 0.15 0.04 
RE_NSDI 364 0.23 0.05 260 0.23 0.05 
Social_NSDI 364 0.16 0.03 260 0.17 0.04 
HDI 364 0.80 0.11 260 0.75 0.12 
Expenditure decent. 364 0.28 0.19 190 0.30 0.18 
Fiscal decentralization 354 0.23 0.18 185 0.24 0.16 
Geographic Fragmentation Index   260 0.35 0.08 
Government size 364 0.36 0.14 200 0.35 0.11 
Human capital 364 1.00 0.20 253 0.91 0.24 
Population 364 16.31 1.76 260 16.24 1.76 
Openness 364 0.90 0.48 258 0.84 0.43 
Depend. on nat. resources 364 0.04 0.07 258 0.04 0.06 
Ethnic fractionalization 364 0.37 0.22 260 0.37 0.22 
Democracy 364 7.38 3.48 260 7.19 3.43 
Corruption 364 5.18 2.39 260 5.18 2.39 









Table A5. The Weights of 12 Indicators in NSDI 








Economic growth Real GDP growth 6.09% 
Income level Income index 9.20% 
Economic 
structure 






Climate CO2 emissions per capita 12.30% 
Air quality PM2.5 7.55% 
Forest Forest area (% of total land area) 8.74% 
Arable land Arable land per person 14.49% 




Education Expected years of schooling 7.14% 
Health Life expectancy index 7.39% 
Drinking-water Population using at least basic drinking-water sources (%) 4.95% 
Sanitation Population using at least basic sanitation facilities (%) 4.45% 
Note: The weights of 12 indicators are following the work of Jin et al. (2020). 
 








Figure A2. The Variation Trend of NSDI of 52 Countries from 2010-2016 
 
